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Abstract 
 
The modern world is characterised by problems that involve systems with social and physical 
subsystems. They are entangled systems of system of systems with multilevel dynamics. There is no 
methodology able to combine the partial micro- meso- and macro-theories that focus on subsystems 
into a coherent representation of the dynamics of the whole. Policy requires prediction, but the 
traditional definitions of prediction are not appropriate for multilevel socio-complex systems. 
Heterogeneous multilevel systems have subsystems that may behave with great regularity over long 
periods of time, and then suddenly change their behaviour due to weak coupling with other subsystems. 
Thus systems that are usually highly predictable may be subject to rare but extreme events, and this is 
highly relevant to policymakers. New ways of thinking are needed that transcends the confines of the 
traditional humanities, social and physical sciences. Of necessity, this science will be embedded in the 
design, implementation and management of systems, and therefore the new science will be entwined 
with policy. Much policy is interventionist experiment. By themselves scientists cannot conduct 
experiments on socio-complex systems because they have neither the mandate nor the money to design 
and instrument experiments on the large scale. Policymakers – elected politicians and their officers - 
design the future, making  it as they believe it ought to be. New kinds of scientific predictions can 
inform policy but can only be instrumented and tested if there is good will between policy makers and 
scientists, where scientists are junior partners. Scientists offer policy makers theories and predictions of 
social systems based on logical-deductive methods. Policy is generally made on the basis of rhetoric, 
with the best possible arguments being deployed to support favoured conclusions. To convince policy 
makers that a particular scientific theory should be used, scientists move from the logical-deductive to 
the rhetorical. Thus the full theory of a science of complex systems has to provide a logical-deductive 
metatheory of the rhetorical and logical-deductive systems that make decisions and implement them. 
Traditional natural and physical science has avoided rhetoric which is much better understood in the 
humanities and social sciences. Thus it is concluded that the science of complex systems must embrace 
the humanities and social sciences not just because their domains of study are relevant but also because 
their methods are necessary to understand how science and policy work together in complex social 
systems. 
 
1. Introduction 
The contemporary world is characterised by problems that involve both physical systems and 
social systems. Natural phenomena such as earthquakes, hurricanes and droughts can cause 
great damage to social systems and much effort is expended trying to predict them and 
mitigate their effects. Over the past century humankind has been surprised to discover that 
social, economic and political activity impacts on the physical systems of the Earth, with 
potentially disastrous global consequences. To address the problems faced by individuals, 
institutions and governments worldwide requires new science able to combine and go beyond 
the best of the traditional humanities, social, biological, physical, environmental and 
engineering sciences. 
The complicated and messy problems we face cannot be solved alone by any existing body of 
knowledge from the social, natural, physical and engineering sciences. From the perspective 
of complex systems science, these problems involve systems of systems of systems. Certainly 
they involve social subsystems, they involve the natural subsystems of the environment, and 
they involve the artificial subsystems of technology and the built environment. These 
subsystems and their subsystems such as families, business, the oceans, the atmosphere, the 
land, houses, shopping malls and transportation are intertwined with many complicated 
interactions. They will be called socio-technical systems. 
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Cities are entangled systems of systems of systems. Their subsystems include individuals and 
families at the microlevel, living in individual houses and apartments. These aggregate into 
wards and districts as political management subsystems. Alongside this are multilevel 
economic subsystems, from the microlevel of the newspaper vendor to the macrolevel of 
multinational companies selling products and services (Alexander, 1965). All this is entangled 
with physical subsystems of roads, parks, buildings, and utilities, themselves entangled with 
business subsystems and various levels of City Hall. The city itself is a subsystem within its 
region, and the region is a subsystem within the nation. 
Whereas there may be well developed theories and models of subsystems such as ecosystems, 
finance, welfare, agriculture, transportation, industry, healthcare, oceans, atmospheres, 
pollution, energy, crime, and conflict - each with their own subsystems – there is currently no 
scientific method able to combine these into a coherent whole. This lack of scientific theory is 
a problem because our inability to combine an understanding of the parts into an 
understanding of the whole makes the predictions that underlie policy unreliable, and may 
lead to unexpected consequences. The public demand for joined-up government will not be 
achieved until we have joined-up science. 
The behaviour of socio-technical systems is unpredictable in a conventional sense, and new 
theoretical perspectives are needed for what it means to predict their behaviour. Here it will 
be argued that the science of socio-technical systems must be developed through policy and its 
application through design, implementation and management. Policy is seen as designing the 
future, and empirical science is necessarily intertwined with policy making and 
implementation. This too poses many problems on what it means to make a prediction. 
It will be argued that a new science of complex systems is needed and that this science will 
embrace the humanities and social sciences alongside the traditional natural, physical, and 
engineering sciences within the framework of policy and applications of policy through 
design, implementation and management. 
 
2. Multidisciplinarity in the Science of Complex Systems 
 
Before going in to the details of the argument that a new science is needed that embraces the 
humanities and social sciences, it may be useful to explain the great difficulties to be 
overcome in achieving it. 
The science of complex system has two major directions. The first is that systems in domains 
such as economics, sociology, psychology, biology, chemistry, computing are inherently 
complex and domain specialists are needed to research and seek detailed understanding of 
them. These specialists provide deep vertical knowledge of their domains. In contrast to this, 
complex systems scientists take a horizontal approach across the particular domains. This is 
because the same phenomena occur with in different forms across the domains and common 
methods may be applied.  It is also because many systems from many domains interact to 
form systems of systems as illustrated by the interaction between economics, climate science, 
and other domains relevant to the problem of climate change. 
Few academics are today trained in a multidisciplinary way. Most universities maintain 
domain-based departmental structures that act as silos, insulating seniors from ideas outside 
their domain and inhibiting the spread of knowledge between fields. Even those predisposed 
to interdisciplinary research usually have depth of knowledge in one or two particular 
domains, and almost no breadth of knowledge across other disciplines. 
Complex systems science is highly interdisciplinary. Generally it is necessary to have 
knowledge in many disciplines, including mathematics, computing, physics, biology, 
economics, sociology, psychology, geography, history, and so on. Some complex systems 
scientists believe that the arts are also necessary for the science. Given this range of domains 
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of desirable knowledge the reality is that almost all of us know almost nothing about almost 
everything. 
Related to this, it is almost impossible for a generalist to know the literature in all possible 
fields, or even the specialist language used. The interdisciplinary approach requires that those 
who do know the culture and literature of their own disciplines are generous and tolerant to 
those who do not. This paper is written in this spirit, and where it can be better informed from 
other perspectives is point of departure for discussion and synthesis. 
3. Prediction 
The natural sciences have put a high value on prediction, as a way of legitimating their 
theories and as the basis of applications. This appears in an extreme form in the writings of 
Laplace in 1814: “We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and 
the cause of its future. An intellect which at any given moment knew all of the forces that 
animate nature and the mutual positions of the beings that compose it, if this intellect were 
vast enough to submit the data to analysis, could condense into a single formula the 
movement of the greatest bodies of the universe and that of the lightest atom; for such an 
intellect nothing could be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before 
its eyes”. Today this view is not tenable. There is no formula that can capture everything, and 
even if there were it could not give predictions in the way Laplace proposed. 
In the nineteen sixties the weather scientist Lorenz discovered a classic example of what is 
today called the theory of deterministic chaos. When using a computer and mathematical 
model to calculate the future states of a weather system, Lorenz discovered that a tiny change 
in the initial conditions of the calculations could make a very large different to the outputs of 
the model. This system was sensitive to initial conditions. Since all measurement has error, 
even if one had a perfect model, computing the future states of the system will result in wide 
variation when the system is sensitive to initial conditions. Lorenz showed that even physical 
systems may not be predictable in the conventional sense that the system will be in a 
particular state at a particular point in future time. 
Let a prediction be defined to be a proposition of the form “if a system is in state s at time t 
and an action or intervention a is applied to the system at time t then the system will be in 
state s’ at some future time within a time interval T. If T is a single point in time, T = {t’}, 
the prediction is called a point prediction. 
As an example, the prediction that “if you are reading this sentence now you will have 
completed reading it within the next minute” will be empirically true for most readers. As 
another example, governments around the world recently predicted that “if large sums of 
money are not given to the banking sector now, then the financial system will collapse within 
a few years” and acted accordingly. So far this prediction holds. As a third example, “if 
greenhouse gas emissions are not capped at the current level the climate will change 
irreversibly by the end of the century”. For most of us this prediction is untestable. 
These examples show that predictions can be vague about when things will happen, they can 
be stated in imprecise ways, and there may be no practical way of testing them. In fact some 
predictions are even more vague by asserting the future state is ‘likely’ or ‘expected but not 
certain’. When systems are well understood probability theory can represent such uncertainty 
in useful ways. When systems are not well understood it is difficult to calibrate the 
probabilities, and in the important case of rare events the probabilities are almost zero and of 
little operational value. 
The laws of physics that determine the behaviour of gases assume that a gas is composed of 
endlessly moving molecules. The faster the molecules move, the hotter the gas. If the 
molecules are constrained to a smaller volume, the pressure increases. The microlevel motion 
of the molecules gives rise to the point-predictive macroscopic law that the temperature of a 
gas multiplied by its volume and divided by its pressure is a constant.  
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This can be illustrated by the compression stroke of bicycle pump, which gets noticeably 
hotter as the volume of air decreases and the pressure increases. In this system it is not 
necessary to know which individual molecule is which, since it is assumed that they all 
behave in the same way. Contrary to this, individual people do not all behave in the same way 
in social systems, and the behaviour of individuals at the microlevel can significantly impact 
on the emergent behaviour of the system at the meso- and macrolevels. For example, if 
someone other than Archduke Ferdinand had been shot in Sarajevo in 1914 the course of 
history might have been different. 
Consider the movement of people in a busy shopping street. It is very rare that they collide as 
they walk past each other. Instead individuals take mutually reinforcing evasive action so they 
miss each other. In a crowd people move according to all the people in their vicinity, and the 
motions and positions of everyone emerges from their local interactions. In general the 
particular position of any individual is unpredictable through time, but the overall patterns of 
movement seem to be the same. There are rare and extreme event when crowds panic, and the 
actions of individuals can result in emergent waves of pressure causing injury and death.  
Some emergent behaviour can be predicted from previous experience but often it cannot. 
Computer simulation provides an important method of predicting behaviour that emerges 
from the interactions of many things – behaviour that may never have been seen before. Since 
the systems simulated are usually sensitive to initial conditions, computer simulations often 
involve distributions of outcomes from many runs with many sets of initial conditions. 
Both the physical sciences and the social sciences recognise the multilevel nature of the 
systems they investigate. The dynamics of cell biological systems is expressed in terms of 
lower level biochemical subsystems. Somehow cells work together to form subsystems such 
as organs and these work together to form bodies that have robust mechanisms enabling them 
to survive in hostile environments. In social science there is a distinction between the study of 
individuals in psychology and the more aggregate behaviour of groups in sociology, 
economics and political science.  
Despite recognising different levels of organisation in complex systems, science has no 
formalism to provide an integrated account of the multilevel socio-technical systems that 
human beings attempt to plan and manage across the globe1. 
In December 2009 politicians from all round the world assembled in Copenhagen to seek an 
international plan to deal with climate change. The meeting ended in failure and 
recrimination. In part this reflects the complexity of this problem. Each of the many hundred 
countries present had a more or less clear view of its own needs as a subsystem. Inevitably 
such a meeting would involve compromise and making deals, and no doubt each national 
delegation had thought through its strategy to achieve what it wanted by conceding what was 
necessary. In the event the desired agreement was not achieved. A typical newspaper headline 
(Vidal et al 2009) reads “Low targets, goals dropped: Copenhagen ends in failure - Deal 
thrashed out at talks condemned as climate change scepticism in action” with the story 
continuing as “The UN climate summit reached a weak outline of a global agreement in 
Copenhagen tonight, falling far short of what Britain and many poor countries were seeking 
and leaving months of tough negotiations to come. …” 
One could conclude many things from this, but the most relevant here is that this failure was 
partly due to a lack of scientific understanding of the process they were engaged in. All the 
                                                 
1 It could be argued that Gidden’s theory of structuration is a counter example to this proposition. 
Certainly this theory is a good point of departure for a new formalism, but the use of vernacular 
language to express the theory is not considered here an adequate formalism. In particular from the 
perspective of complexity science there is the question of how such a theory could be made operational 
to give ‘predictions’ in particular cases based on data. The challenge is for complex systems science to 
provide a more general formalism that social scientists would agree has lost nothing of the original.   
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sciences put together were not able to provide a common understanding of the problem or a 
common understanding of the political process by which it might be resolved. 
The example of the failure of the 2009 climate change negotiations in Copenhagen illustrates 
the failure of prediction at many levels: the scientific predictions of climate change came 
under sustained attack, with some success; the predictions underlying the policies to counter 
climate change were not agreed; and the predictions underlying the negotiations were 
incorrect. Again this suggests that there is no science able to give holistic predictions of the 
behaviour of large heterogeneous socio-technical-politico systems such as these discussions. 
 
4. The Science of Complex Systems 
There is no agreement on what should be the precise definition of ‘complex’2 3, and there are 
many reasons as to why a system might be considered complex. These include having: 
 many heterogeneous parts, e.g. a city, a company, the climate 
 complicated transition laws, e.g. economic systems; disease transmission.   
 unexpected or unpredictable emergence, e.g. chemical systems; accidents. 
 sensitive dependence on initial conditions, e.g. weather systems, investments  
 path-dependent dynamics, e.g. qwerty keyboard evolution, international relations 
 network connectivities, and multiple subsystem dependencies, e.g. ecosystems 
 dynamics emerge from interactions of autonomous agents, e.g. road traffic, parties 
 self-organisation into new structures and patterns of behaviour, e.g. ghetto formation 
 non-equilibrium and far-from equilibrium dynamics, e.g. fighter aircraft, share prices  
 discrete dynamics with combinatorial explosion, e.g. chess, communication systems 
 adaptation to changing environments, e.g. biological systems, manufacturing design 
 co-evolving subsystems, e.g. land-use and transportation, computer virus software 
 ill-defined boundaries, e.g. genetically modified crops, pollution, terrorism 
 multilevel dynamics, e.g. companies, armies, governments, aircraft, the Internet 
 
Many systems exhibit many of these characteristics. Any one of them can make systems 
appear complex, but together they can make systems very difficult to understand and control. 
During the twentieth century it became apparent that many systems could not be investigated 
using the experimental or theoretical methods of the traditional physical sciences.  
The realisation that many systems are sensitive to initial conditions has changed scientists 
attitudes to what it means to make a prediction. Theory alone tells us that there is a horizon 
beyond which prediction is not possible. None-the-less, to plan and manage systems it is 
necessary to be able to predict the consequences of policy interventions. The concept of 
prediction in social systems is different to that in physical system, e.g. in the context of policy 
predictions are intended to be self-fulfilling prophesies, e.g. our policy was to build 1000 
homes this year, we predicted that 1000 homes would be built this year,  and we have built 
1000 homes this year. 
                                                 
2 In his paper From Complexity to Perplexity Horgan (1995) quotes thirty one definitions of complexity given by 
Seth Lloyd  in 2001. Horgan illustrates the diversity by a selection, including entropy (disorder), information 
(surprise), fractal dimension, effective complexity (regularity vs randomness, hierarchical complexity, grammatical 
complexity, thermodynamic depth, time computational complexity, spatial complexity, and mutual information 
(between parts). In his 1999 PhD thesis, Edmonds gives over forty definitions of measures of complexity.  
3 It could be said that the term is contested and therefore a social construct, fitted within an interpretive 
epistemology that provides one of many possible ways to understand the world with all possessing 
some degree of truth. However there is much more agreement on the meaning of the bulleted list of 
more detailed characteristics of complex systems. Furthermore, the existence of many interpretations 
suggests the possibility of knowledge and science at a metalevel above the particular interpretations, as 
discussed later. 
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The science of complex systems attempts to provide methods of understanding the dynamics 
of systems where conventional methods fail. These methods apply across the domains, e.g. 
chaotic dynamics can be observed in biological systems, economic systems, chemical 
systems, road traffic systems, and many others. There are many systems in which the 
behaviour of the whole emerges from interactions between the parts, e.g. traders in markets, 
birds in flocks, people in cities, cars on roads, sportsmen in teams, and cells in bodies. 
Confining scientific enquiry to one domain can give deep insights, but unexpected things can 
happen when a subsystem from one domain interacts with a subsystem from another. In 1956, 
W. Ross Ashby wrote “Science stands today on something of a divide. For two centuries it 
has been exploring systems that are either intrinsically simple or that are capable of being 
analysed into simple components. The fact that such a dogma as “vary the factors one at a 
time” could be accepted for a century, shows that scientists were largely concerned in 
investigating such systems as allowed this method; for this method is often fundamentally 
impossible in the complex systems.” 
Thus complex systems science is necessarily interdisciplinary, integrating knowledge from all 
domains including the humanities, social sciences, natural sciences and the sciences of the 
artificial4. Complex systems science draws on all of these but adds something new. The 
computer revolution of the twentieth century enabled a new kind of science. For the first time 
in history it became possible to analyse the dynamic interactions of millions of things 
explicitly. For example, it is possible to calculate the interactions of millions of drivers in a 
city and to observe the emergent tailbacks and traffic jams, where the simulated dynamics are 
close to those observed. 
Much of our science is based on extrapolation from what has gone before. It is expected that 
the planets will move as they always have done. It is expected that the chemical reaction 
observed yesterday will work the same way today. History provides patterns that can be 
interpreted as the precursors of conflict, and when similar patterns appear it is tempting to 
believe that history will repeat itself. Social work is based on patterns of behaviour that are 
expected to be observed across similar families. This approach to understanding the world 
and predicting its behaviour is very powerful and works well most of the time. Occasionally it 
fails to foresee rare but extreme events, with dire consequences. Computer simulation does 
not have this limitation5. 
Computer simulation is a powerful new scientific method. There are many systems in which 
the meso- and macro-dynamics emerge from the discrete microlevel interactions of many 
agents6. The resulting dynamics are too complicated to be captured by formulae, but 
computer simulation allows those dynamics to be played out at the microlevel to produce 
emergent dynamics at higher levels. Despite having its own methodological problems, 
computer simulation is giving new insights into many kinds of system. Furthermore new 
sources of data are emerging about human beings, including the way individuals use mobile 
telephony and the way people use the Internet for much of their economic and social 
activities. Never in the history of humankind has so much been known about the 
                                                 
4 In his book The Sciences of the Artificial Herbert Simon makes a distinction between artificial and 
natural systems. Artificial systems are man-made and include everything that is designed and 
intentionally created by human beings. Here natural systems is intended to mean physical systems that 
are not deigned and man-made such as the weather. There are of course grey areas such climate change 
which many believe is artificial but created by accident rather than design.  
5 For examples of computer simulations being used to solve practical problems see the article Practical 
Business Applications of Complex Science in the  ASSYSTComplexity Newsletter – Number 2, 
September 15 2009 http://www.rzevski.net/09%209%20Assyst_Newsletter_final_04_JHJ.pdf 
6 The use of the terms ‘micro’, ‘meso’ and ‘macro’ here follow the usual ill-defined usage. In an 
obvious sense individual people could be said to exist at the microlevel, and nations could be said to 
exist at the macrolevel, with anything in between said to exist at the mesolevel(s). In Section 5 the 
terms will be made more precise. 
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microdynamics of whole populations, with emergent data sources eclipsing and augmenting 
traditional census, taxation and survey data.  
While systems behave in relatively slow ways they appear to be manageable. However 
sometimes systems manifest extreme events with combinations of states and dynamics never 
seen before. For example, the world financial system recently experienced the extreme event 
of bank failures, with the possibility of the extreme event of Greece defaulting on its debts 
and consequent social disorder. Other extreme events include the spread of pandemic flu and 
terrorist attacks. Simulation using new data sources is possibly the only way of discovering 
extreme events caused by the unexpected interactions of apparently unconnected subsystems.  
  
5. Science and Policy: Designing the Future 
Policy can be thought of as being concerned with artificial systems designed, created and 
managed as they ought to be (Simon, 1965)7. As such it is normative and assumes that, within 
the constraints of the political systems, the policy maker has a mandate to decide what ought 
to be and to how try to achieve it.  
It can be argued that most policies are unrepeatable experiments. Although they may aim for 
specific goals there is generally no certainty that the goal will be achieved in the way that is 
planned. For example, the fisheries policies of Europe over the last quarter century can be 
seen as an experiment in economics that has resulted in an environmental catastrophe 
(Booker, 2007), but it is not possible to go back to try polices that might have worked better. 
Similarly, the near collapse of the world financial system is due to failed experimental ways 
of reducing risk, but it is not possible to go back try other policies. 
Compared to policymakers, scientists generally cannot conduct experiments on complex 
systems such as a city, a national economy or a multinational company. They do not have the 
mandate and they do not have the money.  Scientists do not have the moral or legal authority 
to make interventions on most systems, and they do not have millions or billions of dollars 
necessary to make interventions. Scientists cannot build bridges or shopping malls, they 
cannot impose new policies on health provision, and they cannot set up new factories, sell 
banks, or buy large tracts of land. To conduct experiments, scientists must align themselves 
with policymakers, as consultants or advisors. In such partnerships scientists must usually be 
the junior partner, tolerated as long as they are useful. 
 
Artificial systems are designed. As shown in Figure 1, the process begins with the 
establishment of needs or requirements and proceeds with the generation of possible ways to 
satisfy those requirements. These are evaluated, and the design solution is either accepted or 
new and better solutions are generated. This process is open ended and in general there are 
many possible ways of satisfying the requirements. Some solutions are better than others, but 
generally the requirements conflict and a compromise has to be reached. For example, a city 
                                                 
7 By definition, the interventions of policy deliberately attempt to change what exists and create 
artificial systems. 
Fig. 1  The simplified requirements-generate-evaluate model of the design process  
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might want to build new public housing to a high standard with a sports centre for a hundred 
families with a budget of a five million dollars. The cost constraints suggest that any design 
solution will have to lower the standards, reduce the number of families, have a more modest 
sports centre, or increase the budget. If it can be found, such a solution is said to satisfice the 
constrains, giving an acceptable compromise. However sometimes no solution can be found 
and the requirements must be revisited. In this case it might be decided that providing a sport 
centre is not practice, and this constraint may be removed. This creates a different problem 
that may be much easier to solve by finding a an acceptable satisficing design. 
The iterative nature of generating and evaluating designs in the context of changing 
requirements underlies a co-evolution between the problem and its solution. The design 
process is one of learning about the system being created, including its possibilities which 
may not have been apparent when the process began8. The process begins by sketching out 
possibilities is a very general way and proceeds by vague possibilities being instantiated with 
concrete specifications. The coevolution between specified requirements and the creation of a 
design to satisfy them is illustrated in Figure 2. At every stage of the design process decisions 
are made affecting the requirements and the final outcome, and for this reason it is essential 
that the policy maker remains in the loop. 
 
The design itself involves predicting how the parts and the wholes in the new system will 
behave. At its simplest, design involve identifying a appropriate set of components and 
specifying has they can be assembled to form parts and eventually the whole multilevel 
system. For example, rooms are built of bricks, doors and windows; houses are assemblies of 
rooms of various types; and estates are assemblies of houses, roads and other services.  
The design of a big system such as a housing project would not be designed bottom- up from 
the minutiae of the bricks and window frames, but would start with a sketch in which, for 
example, individual house might be represented by hastily drawn rectangles. At this stage the 
designer might confirm their hypothesis that the desired number of houses can be fitted into 
the site according to constraints such movement and privacy. Following this the type of house 
be instantiated at a lower level in the representation, some having two bedrooms, some having 
three and some having four.  As the lower levels are instantiated with more concrete things, 
                                                 
8 It will be argued that the process of formulating and executing policy is exactly analogous to design, 
with the possible exception of learning from failure.  
Figure 2. The co-evolution between specification and design through a generate-evaluate spiral 
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the top-down assumptions and hypotheses may be shown to be incorrect. Perhaps it is not 
possible to fit the desired mix of more precisely specified houses on the site, requiring the 
higher level hypotheses to be revisited. The instantiation of the detailed plumbing may reveal 
unexpected cost problems that could compromise the whole project, requiring the analysis to 
be revisited at a higher level of abstraction, with possibly a hypothesis that the project could 
be saved by a lower cost roof construction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Design as bottom-up construction and top-down hypothesis, generation and reasoning 
Thus design is an iterative process of top-down reasoning and hypothesising bottom-up 
construction as more details are added lower down the multilevel representation, as illustrated 
in Figure 3. 
In large complex systems the top-down hypotheses of how the system might behave can be 
very complicated and require the specialist analysis of the whole or subsystems by a scientist. 
When an entirely new system is being designed, the designers are the first scientists of the 
theory of that new system. For example, aeronautical science began with the iterative designs 
of the Wright Brothers and others, while architectural science began much earlier with the 
trail and error design and construction of increasingly larger and more complication buildings. 
Designers can be masters of complexity. They deal with clients who don’t know what they 
want or what is possible, they have to know the regulations that constrain what is allowable 
and negotiate permissions with the authorities, they have to create new systems that will 
satisfice the client’s requirements, they have to manage many processes during the 
fabrications stage, and they have to manage the dynamics of finance and their client’s 
finances. More formally, the interplay between design and complexity has been characterised 
by Alexiou et al (2009): 
 designing complex systems requires a scientific understanding of their dynamics  
 design processes can be complex, e.g. manufacturing processes, supply chains  
 the environment of design can be complex, e.g. regulation, fashion, economy  
 design is a complex collaborative cognitive process 
Level N+k 
Level N+k-1 
… 
Level N+1 
Level N 
to be constructed           The System                initially abstract 
observe 
emergent 
properties 
 
 
 
assemble 
Hypothesise 
substructures 
& relationships 
 
 
 
instantiate 
Published in Innovation - The European Journal of Social Science Research Vol. 23, No. 2, June 2010, 115_134 
10 
 
Design and the implementation of design to create systems are dynamic processes that 
involve predications of how the system will behave. As shown in Figure 4, the prediction 
horizon moves forward in time as the plan is implemented. 
For example, consider again the implementation of a social housing project. At time t0 there 
could be two possible states involving the purchase of the site. Once the site is purchased at 
time t1 some things that would have possible with another site become impossible, and many 
future trajectories get pruned. With the abstract concept of site being instantiated the 
prediction horizon moves forward as it becomes possible to see new future states. In this case 
the instantiation of the site would lead to a period of more detailed planning when it would 
become clearer how many dwellings of which types could be accommodated. Thus one can 
imagine the project moving forward in time, with the decision on the more site detailed layout 
being made, designs for the individual building being made, and contractors being appointed 
to do the work. In an ideal world decisions will be made with the prediction horizon smoothly 
moving forward until the construction of the project is finished, and the system moves in to a 
management regime. Of course projects do not always go smoothly. When the contractors 
start digging the may uncover interesting archaeological remains. Then the designers and 
managers accept the delay and costs over-runs caused, or they may completely revise the 
design to incorporate the new and unexpected component in the design 
                 
 
The design and implementation of projects has been characterised here as selecting 
trajectories within an ever unfolding time horizon, where prediction involves hypothesising 
that certain future states are possible, and that taking a particular action will send the system 
to one of a set of particular future states. This is shown graphically in Figure 5, where the 
system is given an intervention ‘kick’ with the expectation (prediction) that it will end up at 
some target state. From a traditional scientific perspective this becomes a simple experiment 
that can be used to test the underlying theory: give the system the kick and see if the predicted 
state emerges, as shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Experiment as predicting that an intervention kicks will result in a future target state  
 
Figure 4. Predictions in complex socio-technical systems fan out and have horizons 
project 
implementation 
begins here 
as time changes 
from t0 to t1 some 
futures become 
impossible 
At time t1 the 
system moves to 
a new state  
The prediction 
horizon  moves 
forward in time  
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Of course the reality is much more complicated than this. The kick that initiates the housing 
project may be taken in complete ignorance of events that will knock the system off 
trajectory. For example, the discovery of archaeological remains can completely knock a 
building project off trajectory, possibly killing the projects or requiring it to be replaced by 
another. Figure 6 illustrates a project that is continually being knocked of trajectory, by 
unexpected political decisions, unexpected financial problems, and even ‘acts of God’ such as 
a lightening strike. 
 
Figure 6.  What does ‘prediction’ mean when the system is continually knocked of trajectory 
 
In this context policy can be characterised as giving the system a kick in the hope that it will 
reach the target, but with the expectation that unpredictable events will knock it off trajectory 
before the system can reach the target. What does it mean to make a prediction when the final 
state that characterises the prediction will never be reached? How can predictions be tested 
when the target is hard to define in any meaningful way? 
In Figure 6 perhaps the predictions can be tested to the point that the system is first knocked 
of trajectory by political decisions? After the second restorative kick, perhaps the prediction 
behind it can be tested at the point that finance knocks it off trajectory? And after the third 
restorative kick, perhaps the prediction can be tested at the point that lightening strikes? 
Thus prediction in policy and design is more complicated than conventional experiments 
which can be both contrived and simple. This discussion suggests difficulties in what means 
to test a prediction? How can the ‘correctness’ of designs be tested statistically in this 
dynamic environment? Furthermore, what does it mean to make a prediction in a multilevel 
system? Does it mean predicting some particular system states at micro-, meso- or macro 
levels? Or does it mean predicting all system states at all levels, since in complex systems 
microlevel individuals can have massive effects at meso and macro levels. 
For systems that are sensitive to initial conditions a single point prediction has almost no 
information. In general it is necessary to consider distributions of outcomes from the initial 
conditions. This suggests that statistical tests will have to be multilevel, and that there is a  
completely new approach to statistical analysis waiting to be discovered and developed. 
 
6. The logic of science and the metalogic of policy 
As a gross simplification9 it will be supposed that policy making involves identifying 
something as desirable and taking an action to achieve it. The logic of this is that ‘if we do A 
then B will be a desirable consequence’, so we will make policy intervention A. 
Complex systems science is based on well defined principles of logical argument established 
thousands of years ago. A central idea is that one can have propositions, and that these can be 
                                                 
9 For the purpose of exposition the roles of policymakers and scientists are separated. Policymakers - 
elected politicians supported by their apolitical officers - are mandated by the electorate and have the 
moral authority to change society. Scientists do not. This is a clear distinction. Of course the reality is 
that many officers and scientists are political (possibly abusing their favoured position) and the nitty-
gritty of policy is much more messy than suggested here. 
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true or false. Some propositions are empirical, and some are deduced from others e.g. the 
Aristotelian Darii syllogism gives a way of generating new propositions from existing 
knowledge: ‘all men are mortal’ and  ‘Socrates is a man’, implies that ‘Socrates is mortal’. 
The logical operators of conjunction (and) and disjunction (or) allow propositions to 
combined into larger propositions, e.g. ‘all men are mortal’ is a proposition and ‘Socrates is a 
man’ is a proposition, while ‘all men are mortal and Socrates is a man’ is a compound 
proposition which is true if both parts are true. Negation flips the truth value of a proposition, 
so that ‘this house is inhabited is true” when “this house is not inhabited is true”.  
Entailment is at the heart of science, that something implies something else. For example, it is 
argued that ‘not reducing greenhouse gas emissions’ implies ‘the climate will change 
catastrophically’. One of the simplest rules of entailment is modus pones which has the form 
“if A implies B is true, and A is true then B is true’. For example, if ‘the switch is down’ then 
‘the light will be on’ is true, and ‘the switch is turned down’, then ‘the light will be on’ is true. 
In terms of policy modus pones can be applied as follows. ‘The theory tells us that A implies 
B is true’, we want B, we will take action to make A true. Then we will have “A implies B” is 
true and ‘A is true’ so that ‘B is true’. For example, suppose that theory tells us that ‘if the 
children are inoculated then they will not get the illness’ is true and that ‘they will not get the 
illness’ is a policy aim. Then the policy can be to inoculate the children to achieve the policy 
objective that ‘the children will not get the illness’ is true. 
This example illustrates the different roles of the scientist and the policy maker. The 
scientist’s job is to provide theory that provides entailments relevant to the objectives of 
policy makers, such as ‘A implies B’. The policy maker’s job is decide whether B is desirable 
or not, and whether or not it is desirable to take action to induce A with the expectation that it 
will induce B. 
One argument in this paper is that scientists generally do not have the moral authority to 
assert that either A or B are desirable, and generally they do not have the financial resource or 
moral authority to induce A. If a scientists wants to test the hypothesis that ‘A implies B’ they 
will have to convince the policy makers that ‘A implies B’ is true in the context of the policy 
makers judging that B is desirable and that it is desirable to induce A in order to induce B. 
As the climate change example shows, scientists may not be successful in persuading 
politicians that ‘A implies B’, since putting in place A (consuming less energy, higher taxes, 
making payments to poor countries, etc) is such an unattractive policy option while B 
(catastrophic weather events, flooding, population movements, conflict, etc) seems unlikely 
or hard to imagine and so very far off (2050). 
Thus we see that the logic of decision making is not the same as the logical process of 
science. Decision making is almost always conducted in vernacular language. The chains of 
entailment used by decision makers may not obey the same logical standards as science, and 
sometimes they seem perverse. This is because the propositions and entailments that policy 
makers use depend upon their values and belief systems. Politicians are not required to give 
logical justifications for their action – in democracies they are judged at the ballot box. 
In logic, when a proposition refers to something, that something is considered to be at a 
‘lower’ level and the proposition at a meta-level. For example, consider the statement that 
“women have fewer teeth than men”.  Bertrand Russell10 wrote “Aristotle maintained that 
women have fewer teeth than men; although he was twice married, it never occurred to him to 
verify this statement by examining his wives' mouths.” Russell’s statement is at a metalevel 
above the original statement because it is saying something about the statement. 
                                                 
10 Bertrand Russell, Impact of Science on Society (1952) 
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Even if a scientist believes that they have immutable proof that ‘A implies B’ is true, a 
politician may choose to assert that for policy purposes ‘A implies B’ is false. In deciding the 
truth value of ‘A implies B’, the proposition ‘A implies B’ becomes an object in a meta-level 
discussion. Scientists would like this metalevel analysis to go as follows 
“Eminent scientists have told us that ‘A implies B’ is true. Everything that eminent scientists 
tell us is true. Therefore ‘A implies B’ is true.” 
Of course this argument is flawed. Throughout history eminent scientists have been telling 
politicians things that are not true. For this reason the meta-proposition that ‘Everything that 
eminent scientists tell us is true’ is known to be false. At best scientists can hope for the meta-
proposition that ‘Some things that scientists tell us are true’ or even ‘most things that 
scientists tell us are true’. But the logic is that ‘some things that scientists tell us are false’ and 
that ‘A implies B’ may be one of them. Unfortunately the metalevel argument can also 
include “scientists themselves disagree about ‘A implies B’ so we will not use this as an 
assumption in our policymaking”. 
In any logical analysis, inconsistency is fatal. Inconsistency means that the assumptions made 
allow some proposition to be demonstrated as being both true and false, When this happens it 
is possible to show that any proposition in the system is true or false. 
Politicians generally have core sets of beliefs that they are very unwilling to change. For 
example, if a politician believes that the death penalty is desirable, they cannot admit any set 
of assumptions that would lead to the conclusion that the death penalty is undesirable. For 
example, the proposition that miscarriages of justice may happen combined with the 
irreversibility of the death penalty convinces many people that the death penalty is 
undesirable in general. Despite this a politician might argue that although miscarriages of 
justice can happen, there has been no miscarriage of justice in a particular case and that in this 
case execution is desirable. 
Administration and policy can be deeply normative, with the decision maker seeking an 
argument to support a conclusion that they think is desirable. Thus the conclusion of the 
argument is reverse engineered to find premises that will support it. This is exactly the 
opposite to science which works from premises (known facts) to conclusions. Science could 
be said to be based on a form of logical argument based on shared principles of inference and 
interpretation of data11, while policy could be said to be based on rhetoric where arguments 
are formed to be the most persuasive. 
Addressing the question of why we need rhetoric, an article in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy12 on Aristotle’s Rhetoric suggests the following: 
It could still be objected that rhetoric is only useful for those who want to outwit their audience 
and conceal their real aims, since someone who just wants to communicate the truth could be 
straightforward and would not need rhetorical tools. This, however, is not Aristotle's point of 
view: Even those who just try to establish what is just and true need the help of rhetoric when 
they are faced with a public audience. Aristotle tells us that it is impossible to teach such an 
audience, even if the speaker had the most exact knowledge of the subject. Obviously he thinks 
that the audience of a public speech consists of ordinary people who are not able to follow an 
exact proof based on the principles of a science. Further, such an audience can easily be 
                                                 
11 Clair O’Farrell writes “A scientific practice, in Foucault's account, is a particular set of codified relations 
between a precisely constructed knower and a precisely constructed object, with strict rules which govern the 
formation of concepts. Foucault was interested in science for a number of reasons. One of these was that 'science' 
had set itself up as the ultimate form of rational thought. With the Enlightenment, scientific reason became the 
privileged way of accessing truth. According to this view for knowledge to acquire value as 'truth', it had to 
constantly strive to become 'scientific', to construct and organize concepts according to certain rigorous criteria of 
scientificity. Foucault argues that scientific knowledge is not inherently 'superior' or more 'true' than other forms of 
knowledge.” (http://www.michel-foucault.com/concepts/index.html 2007). The argument given here does not 
imply that science is the only form of knowledge. Even within science as defined here there are alternative 
descriptions of systems. However it will be later suggested that all descriptions and forms of knowledge may be 
unified at an appropriate metalevel. 
12 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/, viewed 19th March 2010. 
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distracted by factors that do not pertain to the subject at all; sometimes they are receptive to 
flattery or just try to increase their own advantage. And this situation becomes even worse if the 
constitution, the laws, and the rhetorical habits in a city are bad. Finally, most of the topics that 
are usually discussed in public speeches do not allow of exact knowledge, but leave room for 
doubt; especially in such cases it is important that the speaker seems to be a credible person 
and that the audience is in a sympathetic mood. For all those reasons, affecting the decisions of 
juries and assemblies is a matter of persuasiveness, not of knowledge. It is true that some 
people manage to be persuasive either at random or by habit, but it is rhetoric that gives us a 
method to discover all means of persuasion on any topic whatsoever. 
 
But it is not just policy makers who are faced with a public audience. For scientists the policy 
makers are also a public audience not able to follow an exact proof based on the principles of 
science. To persuade a policy maker that the scientific fact that ‘A implies B’ may require 
rhetoric rather than science. Thus complex systems scientists may need to use rhetoric at the 
metalevel in order to persuade the policy maker to do experiments that contribute to science. 
Since complex systems science is entangled with policy, the science is incomplete without a 
theory of the dynamics of policy and how decisions are made. For example, the science of 
climate change is incomplete without a theory of how scientists and politicians can work 
together to design and implement policies that can lead to desirable futures. The failure in 
Copenhagen in 2009 suggests that such a theory does not exist. This is a challenge for 
complex systems science. 
In the field Artificial Intelligence there has been much interest in automated proof and there 
are systems that can accept sets of propositions and generate their logical consequences. 
There is interest in applying such systems in law to determine the validity of arguments that 
are made in court. It is possible that the distinction between formal logic and rhetoric may be 
clarified using such systems, and this may help to better understand metalevel reasoning. 
 
7. The future of the humanities and social sciences in the science of complex systems 
The main argument in this paper is that humanities and the social sciences will merge with the 
science of complex systems, synthesised into a science that does not have the traditional ‘two 
cultures’ divide. This will not be a comfortable process but already the movement can be 
seen. Many social scientists are already embracing complex systems science and enriching. 
e.g. (Urry, 2005). Complex systems scientists increasingly appreciate that all human activity 
is spatially referenced, and the methods of geography and demography are increasingly 
adopted by complex systems scientists, including the use of digital maps within Geographical 
Information Systems, and an understanding that population data is different the kind of data 
traditionally collected in the physical sciences. Cities can now be considered as exemplars of 
complex systems13, including transportation and settlement patterns such as the emergence of 
ghettos (Schelling, 1971).  
While the humanities and social sciences give deep insights into the complex world that we 
try to design, plan and manage, the many failures of policy show that they are at best 
incomplete sources of knowledge for understanding the future14. The science of complex 
systems has its roots in the natural, physical and engineering sciences, with strong 
connections to mathematics, physics, biology and computer science. These scientists readily 
accept the relevance of  the domains of psychology, sociology, political science, geography, 
history, but they do not easily understand their method of data collection and synthesising 
what is known into theory. The methods of complex systems science bring new ways of 
looking across these domains, and there is a debate to be had with the specialists in those 
domains on the most appropriate ways to investigate them. This debate takes place in the 
                                                 
13 http://www.assystcomplexity.eu/video.jsp?video=55 Evolution, cities and planning, Plenary talk by Michael 
Batty,  European Conference on Complex Systems, ECCS’09, University of Warwick, Sept 2009. 
14 It could be argued that policy failures are inevitable because we may never understand the future due 
the nature of prediction as performative or constituitive. This may be so, but need not be conceded until 
the idea of metelevel resolution as proposed in this paper has been reufuted.  
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context of a lack of scientific knowledge on how to understand, design, plan and manage 
systems of systems of systems, which remains a challenge to all disciplines. 
The social and physical sciences share the experience that a system may change its behaviour 
when observed. This is perplexing in quantum physics but obvious in social systems, e.g. if an 
adult observes children playing the behaviour may be different to what it would have been if 
the adult were not there. At the macrolevel physical systems are more tolerant to being 
observed, and physical scientists assume an objectivity about their observations which is not 
always the case in social systems. For example,  at the mesolevel the ‘Hawthorn’ effect, that a 
social system may improve its performance just by being observed15, is well known in 
management science. The effect of observation at the macrolevel in social systems is 
illustrated by Governments restricting the activities of foreign journalists. Thus the 
instruments for data collection in social systems have difficulties not experienced by many 
coming from the physical sciences. For this reason anthropology and ethnography are being 
embraced in complex systems science. 
Surprisingly some scientists believe that art can contribute nothing to science, e.g. in a recent 
radio programme16  the eminent biologist Lewis Wolpert proclaimed with great certainty that 
“art has contributed zero to science historically. … There are all sorts of images from science 
that can give artists something to work on, but it does not go the other way. … The artist 
couldn’t tell us a thing in that particular area”. Many would disagree with this.  
In the same radio programme Christopher Frayling gave a counter-example from the natural 
sciences: “Fred Hoyle, [was] beginning to work in Cambridge in the late forties, on his theory 
of a cyclical cosmology that things don’t move in a linear way, they move in circles. He goes 
to see a film in nineteen forty eight made by Ealing Studios called Dead of Night. Dead of 
Night begins with someone pulling up at a country house – it ends with the same scene of 
someone pulling up at a country house. In between all sorts of things have happened but the 
entire movie is cyclical. It ends where it begins. It begins where it ends. And he went home 
and wrote in his diary ‘My God! It’s a cosmology. Maybe there’s something in this cyclical 
cosmology.’ The art had reinforced the idea in Fred Hoyle’s mind and off we go with Hoyle’s 
cosmology of the fifties.” Frayling’s example concerns art as inspiration for science. 
Art can play a more direct role in science, as illustrated by the work on organisations by 
Mitleton-Kelly (2003): “During the analysis our resident artist, Julian Burton, will capture 
some of the themes, dilemmas and underlying assumptions in a picture. This has several 
advantages: many related aspects that are difficult to think about at the same time, can be 
captured in one picture; and very sensitive issues that are difficult to talk about, can be 
presented diagrammatically to workshop participants, before the presentation begins. Once 
they recognise what is being shown they may laugh and thus break the tension and open the 
issue(s) to discussion.”  
One such drawing shows a tower block with cracks running through it, people on the top 
spinning plates. The impression is that this organisation is in danger of falling to pieces while 
everyone is over-busy attending to immediate tasks. In the terminology of knowledge 
engineering, this use of art is a means of knowledge elicitation. The implications are (i) that 
art can capture information that cannot be captured in other ways, such as tape recording, 
interview notes, or a questionnaire, (ii) that art can be used in a dialogue that elicits 
information in other ways, including subjects confirming or correcting the interpretation of 
previous interviews, (iii) that the work of art can be a way of enabling subjects to see their 
social situation in new and otherwise threatening ways, and that (iv) that the work of art can 
be part of  a social dynamic, enabling subjects to interact better with the social scientist and 
therefore being willing to provide information that they might otherwise withhold. In this case 
art becomes part of a scientific instrument, and is part of the scientific process. 
                                                 
15 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawthorne_effect 
16 http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/science/thenewtwocultures.shtml  Mark Lythgo, The New Two Cultures, BBC Radio 4, 
25/4/2007. 
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Contemporary art is oriented more towards exploration than traditional aesthetic. As such it 
provides a means of exploring the search space of possible worlds. We have asserted that 
policy makers and scientists design the future, creating and predicting the behaviour of new 
systems that have never existing before. Art can be viewed as the blue sky research laboratory 
of design, and therefore of science and policy. Art gives glimpses of the unknown unknowns. 
The “dismal” social science of economics is in the process of being revolutionised by 
concepts from complex systems science. The premises of conventional economics include 
indefensible notions of equilibrium that are particularly inappropriate for the multilevel 
dynamics of economies and financial systems. Complex systems science is already providing 
new ways of modelling economic systems through agent based simulation and game theory. 
In his article on ‘Meltdown Modelling’ Buchannan (2009) writes “At Yale University, for 
example, economist John Geanakoplos, working with physicists Doyne Farmer of the Santa 
Fe Institute and Stefan Thurner of the Medical University of Vienna, has constructed an 
agent-based model exploring the systemic consequences of massive borrowing by hedge 
funds to finance their investments. In their simulations, the funds frequently get locked into a 
self-amplifying spiral of losses … much as realworld hedge funds did after August 2007.”  
In sociology and political science the values of the scientist may be reflected in the premises 
of their arguments, with some social scientists adopting overtly political positions. In this 
respect there may be a spectrum between the logical-analytic and the rhetorical that can 
inform the essential science-policy duality suggested here.  
 
8. Conclusions 
Complex social and socio-technical systems have been characterised by various properties 
that make them intractable to both the conventional physical and social sciences. The main 
reasons for this are that (i) the macroscopic dynamic behaviour of systems emerges bottom-up 
from the dynamic interactions of autonomous individuals at microlevels, where this is 
constrained top-down by emergent macrolevel properties, and (ii) the dynamics at all levels 
are be sensitive to initial conditions so that unavoidable errors in measurement ensure that the 
predicted trajectories will diverge from those observed, and there is a horizon beyond which 
point-predictions have almost no information. 
The approach of the science of complex systems to modelling the dynamics of social systems 
includes the use of computer simulation as its main tool. The theory underlying simulation 
must be an eclectic synthesis of knowledge from traditional social and physical science, 
augmented by the spectacular new data sources now available through telecommunications, 
powerful networked computation, and human interaction through the Internet. 
The traditional physical science concept of prediction is almost irrelevant in the science of 
complex systems. Point predictions that a system will be in a particular state at a particular 
point in time convey little information when systems are sensitive to initial conditions. 
Complex systems science seeks a new understanding of prediction, including new theories of 
stochastic dynamics and path-dependent dynamics. It is argued that scientific theories of large 
complex systems can only be tested through policy and its application through design, 
implementation and management. In this context prediction is complicated by the final results 
of interventions (experiments) will rarely being seen due to the trajectory of executing the 
plan always being disturbed by unexpected events. This requires a new formulation of the 
concept of prediction, possibly with new statistical procedures for testing predictions. 
The main argument of this paper is that the emerging science of complex systems will 
embrace the humanities and conventional social sciences in the same way that it has 
embraced concepts from the natural sciences. This will involve a synthesis of knowledge from 
the different scientific traditions, and a synthesis of those traditions into a new science 
applicable at all metalevels of human affairs. 
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